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Abstract
Reasoning about agent preferences on a set
of alternatives, and the aggregation of such
preferences into some social ranking is a fun-
damental issue in reasoning about uncer-
tainty and multi-agent systems. When the
set of agents and the set of alternatives co-
incide, we get the so-called reputation sys-
tems setting. Famous types of reputation sys-
tems include page ranking in the context of
search engines and traders ranking in the con-
text of e-commerce. In this paper we present
the first axiomatic study of reputation sys-
tems. We present three basic postulates that
the desired/aggregated social ranking should
satisfy and prove an impossibility theorem
showing that no appropriate social ranking,
satisfying all requirements, exists. Then we
show that by relaxing any of these require-
ments an appropriate social ranking can be
found. We first study reputation systems
with (only) positive feedbacks. This setting
refers to systems where agents’ votes are in-
terpreted as indications for the importance of
other agents, as is the case in page ranking.
Following this, we discuss the case of nega-
tive feedbacks, a most common situation in
e-commerce settings, where traders may com-
plain about the behavior of others. Finally,
we discuss the case where both positive and
negative feedbacks are available.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about agent preferences on a set of alter-
native, and the aggregation of such preferences into
some social ranking is a fundamental issue in reason-
ing about uncertainty and multi-agent systems. When
the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide,
we get the so-called reputation systems setting.
In a reputation system agents are ranked based on
other agents’ reports on their quality of service, be-
havior, or importance. This topic has received a
lot of attention in the recent multi-agent systems
and e-commerce literature (see e.g. (Dellarocas 2003;
Resnick et al. 2000)) . In particular, reputation sys-
tems have become a central ingredient of a variety of
Internet sites, where perhaps the most famous exam-
ples are ebay’s reputation system and Google’s page
rank.
Some reputation systems employ only positive feed-
back. These are in fact systems where agents point
to the importance of other agents. For example, a
pointer from page p1 to page p2 can be viewed as a
positive feedback about the importance of page p2.
Here we get an interesting dynamics where we like to
give more weight to the positive feedback provided by
an important page than to the feedback provided by
a less important page. In other reputation systems
agents provide negative feedback with regard to the
failure of participants in providing a particular ser-
vice. A novel feature that distinguish such reputation
systems for consumer to consumer (C2C) or peer-to-
peer (P2P) settings from classical off-line reputation
systems is the fact that individuals serve both as feed-
back providers, as well as the subject of such feedback.
This again creates an interesting dynamics. In partic-
ular, if there is an agent who is reported to behave
badly then one may like to consider less seriously his
feedback with regard to bad behavior of others.
Reputation systems introduce a new social choice
model. In the classical theory of social choice, as man-
ifested by Arrow (Arrow 1963), a set of agents is called
to rank a set of alternatives. Given the agents’ input,
i.e. the agents’ individual rankings, a social ranking
of the alternatives is generated. The theory studies
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desired properties of the aggregation of agents’ rank-
ings into a social ranking. In particular, Arrow’s im-
possibility theorem shows that there is no aggregation
rule that satisfies some minimal requirements, while
by relaxing any of these requirements appropriate so-
cial aggregation rules can be defined. In the repu-
tation systems setting the set of agents and the set
of alternatives coincide. In addition, if e.g. agent a
provides positive (resp. negative) feedback on the im-
portance of (resp. bad behavior of) agent b then this
may influence the credibility of a feedback by b on the
importance of (resp. bad behavior of) agent c; these
indirect effects should be considered when we wish to
aggregate the information provided by the agents into
a social ranking.
In the social choice setting we discuss in this paper the
input is a reputation graph. The reputation graph is a
directed graph (with no self-loops) where nodes are as-
sociated with agents, and an edge pointing from node
a to node b stands for a (positive or negative) feedback
of a on b. The output is a ranking (i.e. total pre-order)
of the nodes of the graph. This ranking should satisfy
some desired properties. In order to understand some
of the fundamental differences between the classical
social choice setting and the social choice setting in-
duced by reputation systems consider the famous Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom, dis-
cussed in the classical theory of social choice. Roughly
speaking this axiom says that by adding new alterna-
tives and individual rankings of these alternatives with
respect to existing alternatives, the social ranking of
the previously existing alternatives should not change.
This axiom is, and should be, false in any reasonable
social choice setting induced by a reputation system;
new alternatives that provide negative (resp. posi-
tive) feedback on an existing alternative might make it
ranked lower (resp. higher) than another (previously
existing) alternative.
Notice that a natural interpretation/application of the
positive feedback setting is the ranking of Internet
pages. In this case, if a page p points to a set of pages
Q then in fact it declares that the set of important
pages is Q. The problem of finding an appropriate
social ranking in this case is in fact the problem of
(global) page ranking. Particular approaches for ob-
taining a useful page ranking have been implemented
by search engines such as Google. Our ideas may be
used in order to tackle the axiomatic foundations of
such rankings.
We consider three basic postulates for reputation sys-
tems. Below we consider a reputation system with
only positive (resp. only negative) feedback.
Generality: The social ranking should be defined for
any reputation graph.
Transitivity: If the set of agents that provide posi-
tive (resp. negative) feedback on agent a is more
important (resp. more reliable) than the set of
agents that provide positive (resp. negative) feed-
back on agent b then agent a should be ranked
higher (resp. lower) than agent b.
Weak Monotonicity: If the set of agents that pro-
vide positive (resp. negative) feedback on agent
a is not more important (resp. not more reliable)
than the set of agents that provide positive (resp.
negative) feedback on agent b, and a is ranked so-
cially higher (resp. socially lower) than b, then
there should be at least one agent who provides
positive (resp. negative) feedback on a which is
more important (resp. more reliable) than at least
one agent who provides positive (resp. negative)
feedback on b.
In the following sections we will formalize the above
terms, and re-visit the postulates. We prove that there
is no social choice rule that satisfies all the three pos-
tulates. However, we also prove that by relaxing any
of these postulates we get that an appropriate social
ranking exists. In particular, the relaxation of the
weak monotonicity requirement leads to an efficient
(and not immediate) algorithm for determining an ap-
propriate social ranking. For the ease of exposition we
will concentrate in Sections 2–4 on the case of repu-
tation systems with only positive feedbacks. In sec-
tion 5 we will return to the case of reputation systems
with only negative feedbacks. In Section 6 we will dis-
cuss reputation systems where we have both positive
and negative feedbacks. In Section 7 we discuss two
natural refinements of the general setting, namely the
restriction to strongly connected settings and weaken-
ing the monotonicity requirement, showing that these
refinements will not change our basic results.
2 The Setting and Postulates
A (positive) reputation system setting is a directed
graph G = (V,E) (with no self-loops) where V is a set
of agents, and E ⊆ V 2 is a set of positive feedbacks.
The set of agents who provide support for the impor-
tance of node v is {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}. This set of
”supporters” of node v is denoted by R(v). A social
reputation rule S associates with a reputation system
setting, G, a social ranking, S(G), of the correspond-
ing nodes (in V ). More formally, the social ranking is
a function S(G) : V → N|V | where N|V | stands for the
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integers between 1 and |V |. We denote the fact that vi
is at least as preferable as vj in the social ranking, i.e.
S(G)(vi) ≤ S(G)(vj), by vi ≥ vj . We will use vi > vj
to denote the fact that vi ≥ vj but ¬(vj ≥ vi).
When we say that a node vi is ranked (socially) higher
than a node vj we refer to the fact that S(G)(vi) <
S(G)(vj). In the context of positive reputation sys-
tems we will use the terms ”as preferable as” and ”as
important as” interchangeably.
Given a reputation system setting G = (V,E), and a
social ranking S(G), we will say that R(vi) is more
important than R(vj), if there is a 1-1 mapping f :
R(vj) → R(vi) such that for every v ∈ R(vj) we have
that v ≤ f(v) and either f is not onto or there exists
at least one v ∈ R(vj) for which v < f(v).
The intuition of the above is as follows. We wish to say
that the more important are the agents that say that
agent a is important, then the more important a is.
In order to do this we need to refer to the importance
of the supporters of different agents. This calls for a
recursive approach for defining importance, which is
in the spirit of approaches for defining importance in
search engines. Assume we measured the importance
of every agent in R(vi) and every agent in R(vj). If
we can make a 1-1 mapping between R(vj) and R(vi)
such that an agent in R(vj) will be always mapped
to an agent who is at least as important as him, then
R(vi) should be at least as important as R(vj). If, in
addition, one of the agents in this mapping is mapped
to an agent who is more important than he is, or the
mapping does not cover all of the elements in R(vi),
then we say that R(vi) is more important than R(vj).
Similarly, we will say that R(vi) and R(vj) are equally
important if there exists a 1-1 mapping as above, which
is onto, and also f(v) and v have the same rank for
every v ∈ R(vj).
Consider now the following central postulate:
• Transitivity [T]: Given a positive reputation sys-
tem setting G = (V,E) and a social ranking S(G),
then for every vi, vj ∈ V , if R(vi) is more impor-
tant than R(vj) then vi > vj (i.e. vi is more
important than vj).
The T postulate seems central to any rigorous theory
of reputation systems. However, it leaves some cases
quite unclear. For example, if there is one important
agent who provides positive feedback on agent a, and
two unimportant agents who provide positive feedback
on agent b, then the T postulate may allow any order-
ing of a and b. Some rationale for the social ordering
in such cases is provided by the following general pos-
tulate:
• Weak Monotonicity [M]: Given a positive repu-
tation system setting G = (V,E), and a social
ranking S(G), then for every vi, vj ∈ V we have
that if R(vi) is not more important than R(vj)
but vi > vj then it must be the case that there
exist v1 ∈ R(vi) and v2 ∈ R(vj) such that v1 > v2.
The M postulate says that you need to have a real
reason for preferring one agent upon another if this is
not implied by transitivity. In particular, if there is
an important agent who says that a is important, and
two unimportant agents who claim that b is important,
then you can not prefer b to a and say that b is more
important (although you may rank a and b similarly).1
The last postulate is obvious:
• Generality [G]: A social reputation rule S should
associate with every reputation system setting G
an appropriate social ranking S(G).
3 An Impossibility Result
In this section we prove the following general result:
Theorem 1 Given a positive reputation system set-
ting, there is no social reputation rule that satisfies all
of the postulates: G,T , and M .
Proof (sketch):
Consider agents a, b, c, d where a votes for b, b votes for
c, c votes for a, and d votes for a. Given transitivity
agent d should be ranked the lowest. Consider now
agent a and the way that it is ranked compared to
agent c.
If agents a and c are ranked similarly then we get that
b is ranked higher than a and c (otherwise, we will
contradict transitivity). But then (again by transitiv-
ity) c should be ranked higher than b, which yields a
contradiction.
If agent a is ranked higher than agent c, then first no-
tice it must be the case that agent b is ranked lower
than a: if agent b is ranked higher than agent a then
agent c will be ranked higher than a, which is a con-
tradiction; if agents a and b are ranked similarly then
this will imply that b and c should be ranked similarly,
and therefore a and c should be ranked similarly, which
1In Section 7 we show that replacing weak monotonicity
by an extremely weak version of it will not change our
results.
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also yields a contradiction. Therefore, when agent a is
ranked higher than agent c, then it must be the case
that agent b is ranked lower than agent a. Now how-
ever if agents b and c are ranked similarly then this will
contradict transitivity (b will have a stronger support
than c); the same is true if agent c is ranked higher
than agent b. Therefore, we need to consider the case
where agent a is ranked higher than agent c, and agent
b is ranked in between. This however will contradict
weak monotonicity: in this case all supporters of agent
a will have lower rank than the supporter of agent b.
If agent a is ranked lower than agent c then this can
only be if agent b is ranked at least as high as agent
c (since otherwise the support for a will be stronger
than the support for c, which will contradict transitiv-
ity). However, agent b can not be ranked higher agent
c (since he has only agent a in his support); so, we
remain with the case where agents b and c are ranked
similarly, but higher than a. This will however contra-
dict the fact that c is preferable to a (since now a has
a stronger support).
4 A Possibility result
One may ask whether all the previous conditions are
necessary for obtaining the previous impossibility re-
sult. Moreover, one may say that in certain cases some
of the postulates may be relaxed. For example, one
may argue that if only a provides positive feedback on
b, then even if a is the most important agent in the
system then if there are many agents (who are less im-
portant than a) who provide positive feedback on c,
then c should be ranked higher than a; in this case we
may wish to relax weak monotonicity.
It is trivial to see that when relaxing G (generality)
an appropriate social ranking exists. It is also quite
immediate to see that by relaxing T (transitivity) we
always get the desired ranking. In this case if all agents
are ranked similarly then we get an appropriate social
ranking. It should not be a surprise that the question
of whether relaxing M is sufficient for obtaining the
desired ranking is the most subtle. We can show:
Theorem 2 We can always satisfy any pair of the
postulates: G,T , and M .
Proof (sketch):
We will show that we can relax M . The other cases are
rather straightforward as mentioned before. We con-
sider the following algorithm for ranking the nodes of
a reputation graph G = (V,E). Let vli ≥ v
l
j denote the
fact that the social rank of vi is greater than or equal
to the social rank of vj in iteration l of the algorithm.
1. Let k:=0;
2. Let v0i ≥ v
0
j iff |R(vi)| ≥ |R(vj)|
3. If there exist vi and vj such that v
k
i = v
k
j but
R(vi) is more important than R(vj) according to
the vkl (1 ≤ l ≤ |V |), and there is no vs such that
vks = v
k
i and R(vs) is more important than R(vi)
then do(if there is more than one vi and vj as
above, then choose one of them) :
(a) Let vk+1i > v
k+1
l for every vl such that
vkl = v
k
i and R(v
k
l ) and R(v
k
i ) are not equally
important.
(b) Let vk+1i = v
k+1
l for every vl such that
vkl = v
k
i and R(v
k
l ) and R(v
k
i ) are equally
important.
(c) Let vk+1i < v
k+1
l (resp. v
k+1
i > v
k+1
l ) iff
vki < v
k
l (resp. v
k
i > v
k
l ) for every vl such
that vkl = v
k
i .
(d) Let the relation between vk+1q and v
k+1
r , for
every vq = vi and vr = vi be as the relation
between vkq and v
k
r , unless v
k
r = v
k
i and R(v
k
r )
and R(vki ) are equally important, or v
k
s = v
k
i
and R(vks ) and R(v
k
i ) are equally important.
4. If there is no such pair then halt, and output the
current ranking as the chosen one.
5. Let k:=k+1, and go to 3.
Notice that the ranking in stage k + 1 is a refinement
of the ranking in stage k, where all we may do is make
i preferable to j where they were ranked similarly be-
fore. If R(vi) is more important than R(vj) in iteration
k, then it can not become less important than R(vj) in
the future . This is implied by the definition of ”more
important”. In order that R(vi) will be more impor-
tant than R(vj) in iteration k then we need to show a
1-1 correspondence between R(vj) and R(vi) that will
map the elements in R(vj) to elements with equal or
higher ranks in R(vi), where we have one strict prefer-
ence or the mapping is not onto. When we refine the
rankings in future steps, some of the equalities in the 1-
1 mapping may become inequalities but still R(vj) can
not become more important than R(vi). In addition,
notice that when vi is selected in iteration k, then each
agent vj with R(vj) of similar importance to R(vi) at
this stage is ranked similarly to vi. As a result, by it-
eratively applying the transitivity requirement we can
not contradict future changes in the coming iterations.
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Notice that since any iteration is just a refinement that
makes the ranking more strict, then this procedure will
be over after O(|V |) iterations. The final output will
be consistent with transitivity by the arguments above,
and by the fact that if there exist vi and vj whose
relative ranking should be refined to satisfy transitivity
then the procedure will not stop and will make further
refinements.
Further formal details are omitted due to lack of space
and will appear in the full paper.
Intuitively, the algorithm which allows satisfying tran-
sitivity for arbitrary graphs makes use of the following
idea. We first sort agents based on their in-degree,
the higher is the in-degree of a node the higher is its
rank. Then, we recursively refine the rankings, i.e.
make indifference into strict preference, while keep-
ing previously existing strict preferences, by applying
transitivity. The fact we use only such refinements
will prevent us from entering into cycles. Assume that
agent i has been ranked higher than j in the above
process. If the size of the support set of i is greater
than the size of the support set of j then no further
refinements will lead to a situation where the support
set of j is more important than the support set of i.
Otherwise, if a refinement made i preferable to j then
consider the sorted list (from low to high) of the ranks
of the supporters of i and j, respectively. Consider
the first agent, v, in the (sorted) support set of agent i
such that the corresponding agent, v′, in the (sorted)
support set of agent j is ranked lower than it. Such
an agent must exist, based on our construction. In
this case, no further refinements will be able to make
v ranked lower or equal to v′ (since, again, refinements
do not change previous strict preferences). This kind
of reasoning is the basic intuition behind the fact we
get no cycles. Other parts of the algorithm are needed
for full correctness (e.g. the fact we need to take care
that agents with support sets of the same strength will
be ranked similarly etc.).
5 Reputation systems with negative
feedbacks
In order to introduce reputation systems with negative
feedbacks, we need to understand the subtle difference
between the cases of positive and negative feedbacks.
Consider a system with three agents a, b, c, and a rep-
utation graph where a points to b and b points to c.
When the pointers refer to positive feedbacks then it is
obvious that c is the most important, while b is more
important than a. This is in fact a simple instance
of the transitivity requirement we had before. On the
other hand, the logic in the case where the pointers
refer to negative feedbacks may (and should) be quite
different. Agent a is the only one that no one provides
negative feedback about him, and therefore he should
be ranked first. Now we need to compare b and c, but
since a is the most reliable agent (i.e. ranked first)
then agent b should be ranked the lowest and agent c
should be ranked in the middle. This means that the
transitive effects here are of very different nature than
in the case of positive feedbacks. As a result, although
our definitions, results, and algorithm for the positive
and negative reputation settings, may seem relatively
similar to one another, the ”local” differences between
these cases have significant effects, and should not be
neglected.
Now we have a (negative) reputation system setting,
which is a directed graph G = (V,E) (with no self-
loops) where V is a set of agents, and E ⊆ V 2 is a set of
negative feedbacks. For every v let R(v) be as before,
now standing for the set of agents who provide negative
feedback on v. Given a negative reputation system
setting G = (V,E), and a social ranking S(G), we will
define when R(vi) is more reliable than R(vj) similarly
to the way we defined ”more important” before (all
changes until this point are only in the interpretation
of the edges).
Now we wish to say that the more reliable are the
agents that say that a is unreliable, the more unreli-
able a is. Similarly, the more unreliable these agents
are, the better a’s reputation is. Of course, if no one
provides negative feedback with regard to a, then he
is indeed very reliable. The above discussion leads to
a revised transitivity postulate. Similarly, it leads to a
revised weak monotonicity postulate. These are stated
below:
• B-Transitivity [BT]: Given a negative reputation
system setting G = (V,E), and a social ranking
S(G), then for every vi, vj ∈ V we have that if
R(vi) is more reliable than R(vj) then vi < vj
(i.e. vi is less reliable than vj).
• B-Weak-Monotonicity [BM]: Given a negative
reputation system setting G = (V,E), and a so-
cial ranking S(G), then for every vi, vj ∈ V we
have that if R(vi) is not more reliable than R(vj)
but vi < vj then it must be the case that there
exist v1 ∈ R(vi) and v2 ∈ R(vj) such that v1 > v2.
The Generality postulate will be defined as before, but
now it is applied to negative reputation system set-
tings.
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5.1 An (im)possibility result – the negative
feedbacks setting
In this section we prove the following general result:
Theorem 3 Given a negative reputation system set-
ting, there is no social reputation rule that satisfies all
of the postulates: G,BT , and BM . By relaxing any
one of these postulates we get an appropriate social
ranking.
Proof (sketch):
First we show the impossibility result.
Consider the graph G(V,E) with nodes a, b, c, d, and
the following edges (reports): a points to b, b points
to c, c points to d, d points to a, a points to c.
Consider the relative ranking of a, b, and d.
If b = d then transitivity implies that it must be that
a = c (since a and c are the only ones that point
to b and d, respectively). However, by transitivity it
also must be the case that a > c (since b = d and in
addition a points to c), and therefore we get a contra-
diction.
If a = d then transitivity implies a = d = b, and that
c < a = b = d. This however should imply that d
(who is pointer to only by c) should be ranked higher
than a (who is reported only by d), which yields a
contradiction.
If a = b then transitivity implies that c < b = a, and
therefore (again by transitivity) that d > b = a. Now
however, a and b are ranked similarly, while a has a
more reliable support, which yields a contradiction.
The above cases show that a, b, d should appear in
three different ranks, and we consider below all 6 pos-
sibilities.
Assume that d > a > b then this immediately contra-
dicts transitivity, since d is the only one that points
to a and a is the only one who points to b, while a is
ranked higher than b.
Assume that d > b > a. If c ≥ a then it should be
that b ≥ d, and therefore it must be that c < a. But
now, since d is ranked higher than both a and b, the
fact c < a contradicts weak monotonicity.
Assume that a > d > b. Monotonicity implies that
c < b. But this contradicts the fact that a > d, since c
is ranked lower than d, and c (resp. d) is the only one
that points to d (resp. a).
Assume that a > b > d. Then transitivity implies that
c < b. This contradicts however the fact that b > d,
since c is the only one that points to d, and is ranked
lower than a, who is the only one who points to b.
Assume that b > d > a. Then, transitivity implies
that c < a. However, now c, who is the only pointer
to d, where d < b, is ranked lower than a, who is the
only pointer to b, which contradicts transitivity.
Assume that b > a > d. This immediately contradicts
transitivity, since both a and b have only one agent (d
and a, resp.) that point to them.
To prove possibility when relaxing any of the postu-
lates, we observe again that relaxing the weak mono-
tonicity requirement is the most subtle. We use a
slightly revised version of the algorithm for the pos-
itive feedback case.
The reader should notice that although the axiomati-
zation for the cases of positive and negative feedbacks
are similar, the connections between these cases are
not immediate. In particular, we can show that there
are graphs for which, when considering ”positive feed-
back”, no appropriate social ranking exists (if we wish
to satisfy all requirements), while when we consider
the complement graph and interpret it as ”negative
feedbacks” then an appropriate social ranking (which
satisfies all related requirements) does exist. In the
complement graph an agent will provide negative feed-
back on the set of agents on which he did not provide
positive feedback in the original graph (excluding it-
self; we assume both graphs do not have self-loops).
To see the above consider the following setting.
Agents: a, b, c, d. Pointers: a points to b, b points
to c, c points to d, d points to b.
One can check that in this case we do not have any so-
cial ranking that satisfies transitivity and weak mono-
tonicity when one interprets the pointers as ”positive
feedback”. However, in the reputation system with
”negative reports”, which refers to the complement
graph, we get that d > c > b > a is an appropriate
social ranking .
6 Reputation systems with both
positive and negative feedbacks
Our results can be extended to the case where we have
two types of pointers: ”positive feedback” and ”neg-
ative feedback”. In this case we have two types of
incoming edges to node vi: the negative reports with
regard to vi – Rb(vi), and the positive reports with
regard to vi – Rg(vi).
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Transitivity will be defined as follows: we will say that
R(vi) is socially stronger than R(vj) if Rb(vi) is either
less reliable or have the same reliability as Rb(vj) and
Rg(vi) is either more important or as important as
Rg(vj), with at least one strict inequality. We now
require that if R(vi) is socially stronger than R(vj)
then vi should be ranked higher than vj . Weak mono-
tonicity will require that at least weak monotonic-
ity with regard to Rb or with regard to Rg should
hold, i.e. if R(vi) is not socially stronger than R(vj)
but vi is ranked higher than vj then either there are
v1 ∈ Rg(vi), v
′
1 ∈ Rg(vj) such that v1 > v
′
1 or there
exist v2 ∈ Rb(vi), v
′
2 ∈ Rb(vj) such that v2 < v
′
2.
We will refer to a reputation system setting with both
negative and positive feedbacks as: complete reputa-
tion system setting. We will denote the corresponding
transitivity, weak monotonicity, and generality postu-
lates in this case by Tc,Mc, Gc, respectively.
Theorem 4 It is impossible to satisfy all 3 postu-
lates: Tc,Mc, Gc for complete reputation systems set-
tings with both positive and negative feedbacks. Relax-
ing any of these postulates will allow generating appro-
priate social rankings.
Proof (sketch):
The impossibility result is implied by the previous im-
possibility results. In order to show that we can get
Gc and Tc (without Mc) we use similar ideas to the
algorithm presented for positive feedbacks, employing
the new definition of ”socially stronger”.
7 Discussion: strongly connected
systems and very weak
monotonicity
We have seen that if we adopt all our three basic
postulates then an appropriate impossibility result is
obtained, while any pair of these postulates can be
satisfied. We now consider the idea of weakening the
postulates without completely removing any of them.
In particular, one may wish to consider less general
settings where not every reputation graph is possible,
and/or some weakening of the weak monotonicity pos-
tulate. We will concentrate below on the case of posi-
tive reputation settings, although our findings do hold
for the other settings discussed in this paper as well.
Two major refinements suggested to us by researchers
interested in the practice of page ranking are the fol-
lowing:
1. It may be useful to consider only strongly con-
nected reputation graphs, where there is a di-
rected path from node v to node t for any pair
of nodes v and t = v. This is due to the fact
that these are graphs where page ranking tends
to ”behave well”. We will call the related gener-
ality assumption: weak generality [WG].
2. It may be useful to restrict the weak monotonicity
assumption by requiring that it will hold only for
nodes vi and vj which have supports of more or
less the same size. This is done in order to allow
a node vi to be socially ranked higher than vj ,
when this is not implied by transitivity and there
is no element in R(vi) which is ranked higher than
some element in R(vj), if the size of the support
of vi is much larger than the support of vj . A very
weak (and therefore satisfactory for the result be-
low) version of this, that we call very weak mono-
tonicity [VWM] is the following: Given a positive
reputation system setting G = (V,E), and a so-
cial ranking S(G), then for every vi, vj ∈ V where
vi > vj , if R(vi) is not more important than R(vj)
and |R(vi)| ≤ |R(vj)|+1, it must be the case that
there exist v1 ∈ R(vi) and v2 ∈ R(vj) such that
v1 > v2.
We can show:
Theorem 5 Given a positive reputation system set-
ting, there is no social ranking that satisfies all of the
postulates: WG,T , and V WM .
The proof of Theorem 5 uses a similar construction
to the one used in Theorem 3, which is based on a
strongly connected setting. The fact we require very
weak monotonicity does not prevent us from reaching
impossibility since the maximal difference in the in-
degree of nodes in the above construction is at most
one.
Similar results can be presented for reputation sys-
tems with negative feedbacks, and for settings where
we have both positive and negative feedbacks. The
above result suggests that small ”natural” refinements
of the basic postulates do not suffice for obtaining a
possibility result, while such a result is obtained by
dropping any single postulate.
8 Conclusion
Reasoning about preferences and preference aggrega-
tion is a fundamental task in reasoning about uncer-
tainty and multi-agent systems (see e.g. (Boutilier
et al. 2003; Conitzer & Sandholm 2002; Yager 1991;
LaMura & Shoham 1998). When the set of agents and
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the set of alternatives coincide, preferences among al-
ternatives can be viewed as feedback by the agents
on the importance or the reliability of other agents.
This brings us to the study of reputation systems.
Reputation systems are fundamental ingredients of
some of the most famous tools/techniques in the In-
ternet (e.g. Google’s page rank and ebay’s reputa-
tion systems, among many others). Moreover, the
task of building successful and effective on-line trad-
ing environments has become a central challenge to the
AI community (Boutilier, Shoham, & Wellman 1997;
Monderer, Tennenholtz, & Varian 2000; Sandholm
2003). Feedback mechanisms are believed to be fun-
damental for the establishment of such environments.
Although reputation has always been a major is-
sue in economics (see e.g. (Kreps & Wilson 1982;
Milgrom & Roberts 1982)), reputation systems have
become so central recently due to the fact that some
of the most influential and powerful Internet sites and
companies have put reputation systems in the core of
their business.
Our aim in this paper was to to treat reputation sys-
tems from an axiomatic perspective. The classical the-
ory of social choice lay the foundations to large part
of the rigorous work on multi-agent systems. Indeed,
the most classical results in the theory of mechanism
design, such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard
1973; Satterthwaite 1975) are applications of the the-
ory of social choice. Moreover, previous work in AI has
employed the theory of social choice for obtaining foun-
dations for reasoning tasks (Doyle & Wellman 1989)
and multi-agent coordination (Kfir-Dahav & Tennen-
holtz 1996). It is however interesting to note that rep-
utation systems suggest a novel and new type of the-
ory of social choice. We see this point as especially
attractive, and as a main reason for concentrating on
the study of the axiomatic foundations of reputation
systems.
In this paper we attempted to capture basic ingredi-
ents of what we believe is a new axiomatic theory of
social choice. Of course, much is left to be done, and
we hope that others will join us in addressing the chal-
lenge of establishing a rigorous axiomatic approach to
reputation systems.
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